Last month, the second Russia-Africa summit was held in St. Petersburg, Russia. The summit was attended by less than half of the heads of state from the first summit. As usual, the African leaders “begged” Russia for quite a number of things, and Russian President Vladimir Putin responded with numerous promises of “help” to Africa, including free grain, overwriting of debts, medical donations, scholarships, and more. However, telling apart “mere promises” from the actual ones is important, and I will try to do just that.
A lot of economic requests were sent to Russia.
The only ‘non-economic’ request to Putin I saw across the summit’s attendees was “silencing the guns” in Ukraine. But every African country represented at the summit emphasized the need for “Russia to help” them either with their wars or some sort of economic investment and aid.
After reading to the attendees about the long colonial history and its impacts on the continent and stressing the colonial legacy in contemporary Africa, what many analysts call “anti-colonial rhetoric,” President Museveni of Uganda now dives straight into making his requests to Russia. He begins by proposing a “policy decision” by the Kremlin to buy value-added products processed in Africa instead of raw materials. For instance, by choosing chocolates instead of cocoa beans, processed coffee instead of coffee beans, and batteries instead of lithium, President Museveni showed his frustration with the West over unfair trade policies favoring exporting raw materials by African countries over processing. Russia, according to Museveni, could turn Africa into a manufacturing hub. The Ugandan leader continued to invite Russia to explore oil resources, invest in its energy sector, and build fertilizer plants. On the security front, President Museveni requested credit for purchasing Russia-made military equipment, again taking us to the “help” analogy.
Going further, Nigeria’s and Sudan’s leaders need Russia’s military support in the fight against terror in their countries and the Sahel region. The list could go on and on, and just like I said, you wouldn't expect much apart from economic and military help requests.
Now, let’s see what Russia wants. Again, using the simple “demand and supply” principle, we need to see if the two forces are on par with each other or if there is a “coincidence of wants.” For a business to happen, drawing from my secondary school economics, you need to produce what I want, and I should be able to afford it. To better understand Russia’s global expansion into Africa, we will analyze a couple of economic, political, and social factors.
The Primakov Doctrine: Russia’s Quest for Global Dominance
Over the past decades, Moscow has attempted to increase its footprint, particularly in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. In Africa, for instance, Russia is seen as an old friend who stood with the continent in its struggles for independence. No wonder South Africa’s late independence came true with massive support from the Soviet Union. The Primakov Doctrine, a blueprint for Russia’s foreign policy designed by Russia's Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov in 1996, emphasizes Russia’s protest of the U.S.-led, or broadly speaking, “Western-dominated” international system and the quest for a multipolar world, inclusive of Russia as a major power. One can argue that this same doctrine motivated Moscow to annex Crimea in 2014, deploy in Syria, and engage in other foreign policy activities around the world. Russia also saw the “unfinished” Western-started wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and elsewhere as an opportunity for the Kremlin to assert global influence. Following this same trajectory, it appears clear that the invasion of Ukraine fits properly with the Primakov Doctrine. The Doctrine also reminds the world that Russia is a superpower with a place on the world stage.
But why is Russia expanding into Africa? Since 2017, Russia’s Wegner Group, a Private Military Company linked to the Kremlin, has expanded its operations to about half a dozen African countries, including the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Sudan, and Libya. It is estimated that the Wegner Group’s presence in Africa is about 5,000 troops, and they provide military support to their ‘clients’ and sometimes engage in direct military activities. In the Sahel, the recent junta leaders, including the Niger coup leader, are believed to have been supported by the Russian Wagner troops to oust their countries’ democratically elected or at least serving presidents.
The French embassy in Niger was attacked by coup supporters, who tore down the French flag and raised the Russian flag just weeks after the coup. In Mali last year, the French embassy was burned down, and French troops were expelled while Wagner troops advanced. In Burkina Faso and Guinea, the exact same scenario was witnessed; the generals who aligned with Russia carried out military coups and took control of their countries.
Unlike China and perhaps the traditional Western ‘friends’ of Africa, whose strategy has mostly been associated with aid and economic investment, Russia’s approach in the new “battle for Africa” has taken on a rather political dimension, something, I argue, the African countries want to change.
Regarding our question of what exactly Russia wants in Africa, I would like to remind you that Africa has 55 states, all of which are represented at the UN General Assembly. If Russia’s global plans are to go smoothly at the UN, it will need more support, and Africa seems to have the numbers. Of the 35 countries that abstained from the UN vote to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, 17 were African countries, including Uganda. Therefore, Russia sees Africa as a potential ground for friendship at a time when the Kremlin faces international isolation. Over the past six months, Russia’s Foreign Minister has visited numerous African countries, including Uganda, Kenya, Mali, South Africa, and Burundi. The Wagner Group is increasing its influence on the continent, and Russia will continue to assert political influence in Africa.
For you to maintain your votes, you need to strengthen your friendship. For most African countries, this friendship can only be strengthened through “economic help” through loans or grants, scholarships, and other “freebies.” I have always said that global leadership is expensive, and I ask myself whether or not Russia has the means to ‘help’ Africa. Let’s explore this further under the next heading.
Economy
It looks like every head of state who went to Russia expected to have an “economic” promise from Putin in the back of their mind. To fully understand whether or not their expectations will be met, we need to dig deeper into the Russian treasury and domestic economic situation. Museveni and Évariste Ndayishimiye must be smiling after Russia offered mobile laboratories to Uganda and Burundi, respectively. Six other African countries were promised tonnes of free grain. Putin also pledged more scholarships for African students. But if I am right, Museveni wants mega investments, not “free corn” or “scholarships.” I remember the Ugandan leader saying:
I thank you very much for the laboratory, and I thank you for the scholarships. Even in the past, we have had many of our students studying here. But now we propose new areas, like, for instance, the area of refinery and exploration of petroleum products…. - Museveni
This statement only demonstrates how much African leaders want more economic help than military help.
In terms of investments, Russia has had very little to offer the African continent, with total investments accounting for only about 1% of investments on the continent. Much of its investment is in the security sector. In the first Russia-Africa summit, Russia pledged $14 billion in arms sales to Africa annually. But we are talking about roads, bridges, railways, dams, etc. Not scholarships, grains, or guns. While those are surely pressing issues in Africa, African leaders seem to be eying the big fish. The roads and the like.
Even for arms sales, African countries seem to want credit offers. Listen to what President Museveni said about Russian arms sales to Uganda.
We want to buy more. We have been paying in the past. Cash. Cash. Cash… We propose that you supply and we pay. That would be some sort of credit supply. - Museveni
In 2011, Uganda bought Russian military jets and other hardware worth $744 million. In 2021, Uganda signed yet another contract to procure six more fighter jets from Russia. In fact, the latest visit by Russia’s foreign minister, Lavrov, broke some interesting news.
The center of maintenance of aviation equipment produced in the Soviet Union has been set up and made operational in Uganda. - Lavrov.
Although the Russian economy has endured sanctions for decades, it now struggles with the countless sanctions imposed by Western countries, especially after the invasion of Ukraine in February last year. Again, after spending so much money in Ukraine and experiencing declines in exports, the Russian rouble just fell to a 16-month low, triggering the central bank to hold an “extraordinary” meeting to save the economy. Also noteworthy is that Russia doubled its military spending to $100 billion last year to execute its Ukraine mission, something many analysts think continues to impact the economy.
Due to its struggling economy, Russia might want to draw closer to Africa but may not have the economic means to sustain the friendship. The Kremlin should ask Beijing what happened to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) loans on the continent. President Xi had to change his tone when talking about the BRI. From the “projects of the century,” which he praised in 2013, to what he now calls “small and beautiful projects,” BRI has clearly lost steam. According to a recent Green Finance and Development Centre report, BRI funding for sub-Saharan Africa plunged 54 percent last year, from US$16.5 billion to a record low of US$7.5 billion. This shift was partly driven by the deteriorating economic situation at home and “bad debts.” But I thought Russia learned something after forgiving 23 billion in loans to African countries. Russia needs “true consumers,” not “bad debtors,” for its economy to thrive and its war mission in Ukraine to go as planned. This, in my opinion, is the real nightmare for President Putin. Finally, I want to remind us that there’s nothing free in any country. Everyone has their interests.
Even if Russia were to ramp up its investment in Africa, it would be up to something. The Wagner Group, for instance, makes a fortune from its overseas military missions in Africa and the Middle East. The Wagner Group generated $250 million from natural resources in Africa and the Middle East in the four years before the invasion of Ukraine. In Syria, the Group reportedly gets up to 25% of the oil revenue from any oil and gas fields it rescues. At the same time, in the Central African Republic, they control gold and diamond mining in exchange for their security services. Why doesn't France want to leave West Africa alone? This is another good question for you to ask. Although celebrated, the exit of Western powers such as France from West Africa might appear as if the countries are “swapping parasites” instead of killing them. It would be interesting to see how far this renewed Russia-Africa cooperation goes.
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