The end of the Cold War only reduced interstate conflict and gave rise to intrastate conflicts (Goodhand and Hulme 1999, 13). However, intrastate African conflicts have often been viewed through a ‘domestic' lens. This way of thinking aligns with Brown’s four clusters that underpin intrastate conflicts: structural factors, political factors, economic/social factors, and cultural/perceptual factors (Brown 1996, 13; Downes 2021, 88). However, intrastate conflicts in Africa have often been viewed through the "domestic lens"—the ethnic lens—with political groups mounting pressure on each other or the government over dissatisfaction (Schultz 1983, 1). This school of thought parallels the notion that intrastate conflicts are entirely a result of domestic factors. Hill (2012) pointed out three factors that have led to the failure and success of Nigeria since independence: federalism, oil, and the army (Hill 2012, 126).
In this article, I argue that the causes of the 2023 Sudan Conflict are multifaceted, resulting largely from geopolitical power plays in the country.
This article argues that the role of the U.S. and its allies is largely responsible for the current crisis in Sudan. The U.S. and Sudan have had an “on-and-off” relationship since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, when the U.S. officially supported Israel (Malik and Malik 2015, 2). In 1997, the U.S. labelled Sudan a “state sponsor of Islamist terrorism,” and the Clinton Administration sanctioned Sudan, significantly affecting the country’s political, economic, and social affairs. In 1997, the US destroyed the newly constructed Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, mistakenly believing that the developers had ties to Bin Laden and that the factory was being used to process chemical weapons (Malik 2015, 3). The sanctions mounted pressure on the economy, leading to countrywide protests and the eventual deposition of Omar Al Bashir the following year (Hassan, Mai, and Ahmed Kodouda 2019, 96). I argue that the U.S. created conditions that led to the deposition of Bashir’s government.
This form of regime change fits into Downes’ analysis. According to Downes (2021), regime change may occur in three ways: compellent threats demanding leader change, invasion, and overt and covert interventions in which external forces are located inside the target or in a nearby state Downes 2021, 20).
Other foreign influences have been witnessed from Russia, China, Egypt, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. For instance, Russia’s Wegner Group has been deployed in Sudan since 2017 and engaged in mineral mining (Doxsee 2023). In 2020, Russia and Sudan agreed to build a naval base on the Red Sea (Ramani 2020). China’s investments in Sudan are also overwhelming. For instance, the Greater Nile Petroleum Company (GNPC) is largely owned by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) of China, with 40% of the shares (Mehmood Khan, Rahim, and Yousufi 2020, 321).
Post-Bashir Sudan and External Influence
Following the overthrow of Bashir, the U.S. and its allies backed the Transitional Military Council (TMC), urging it to cede power to a civilian-led transitional government (CLTG) that respects human rights, freedom, and democracy. However, according to Downes’ theory, “Foreign-imposed regime change” creates chronic fault lines in the target state (Downes 2021, 87). Unsurprisingly, in April 2023, fighting broke out between two once-united army generals, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) of the paramilitary rebel group Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and General Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman al-Burhan of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The furious fights that entered their fifth month displaced over three million people and killed over 4,000 people (UNHCR 2023).
The Invisible Hands in the Sudan Conflict
Despite several efforts underway to resolve the conflict in Sudan, including the United Nations through its mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), the African Union and the regional bloc Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the U.S. and Saudi Arabia peace talks, and neighbouring countries, the conflict is escalating (Kobena 2023). The same foreign interference, something I call the “Invisible Hands,” is equally responsible for the persistence of the war. In my view, the U.S. will continue to be mentioned here for several reasons. First, the military-civilian power-sharing after the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir saw both al-Burhan and Hemedti as dominant leaders at the expense of the civilians. Moreover, after the overthrow of Bashir, the Trump administration didn't condemn the coup. Again, the U.S. did little to punish the generals when they led another coup that toppled civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok.
As de Waal puts it, Hemedti’s RSF is now a “private transnational mercenary enterprise” that has rented its services to Gulf monarchs to fight in Yemen and has dealings with the Wagner Group and Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army (de Waal 2023). The U.S. also remains the largest historical arms supplier to not only Sudan but the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, from Sudan’s independence in 1956 to 1976, America transferred $2 million in arms to Sudan (Lefebvre 1991, 212). China also has a history of selling arms to war-torn countries. In 2015, a report stated that China sold weapons worth $20 million to South Sudan (Tiezzi 2015). The RSF has strong support from Yemen, given their historical military cooperation under President Omar al-Bashir. I argue, therefore, that without the USA’s, Chinese's, Yemen’s, Russia's, and other arms enterprises, the conflict in Sudan would be milder.
The U.S., UK, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates (QUAD) diplomatic and peaceful strategies for Sudan, although they might be well-intentioned, exposed numerous flaws. For instance, the UAE and Saudi Arabia condemned the coup, implying they supported the SAF. Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have invested heavily in Sudan. On the one hand, Egypt’s support for al-Burhan’s SAF is based on several grounds, most importantly, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which both Egypt and Sudan oppose. Historically, Egypt’s relations with Sudan deteriorated when President Omar al-Bashir was in power, but Egypt also worries that spillovers of terror might become an issue in Egypt.
“..., secondly that any political process must be an inclusive Sudanese owned process, and thirdly, the strong rejection of any foreign interference in what is already a dangerous crisis in Sudan, with grave implications for the region and the continent.”
My argument on the persistence of the conflict is not far from that of the African Union—foreign interference.
Opportunities for Peace
Based on the historical facts surrounding the conflict and drawing on the African Union’s warning, I argue that bilateral peace arrangements, especially by non-African actors, should cease, and African-led solutions driven by the African Union and IGAD should continue. The UN should also impose an arms embargo under the UN Security Council’s resolution 2428 (2018) to limit sales or supplies of arms and related materials or provide assistance or personnel to the warring parties.
Conclusion
The causes of the Sudan Conflict are multifaceted, with domestic and foreign forces driving the situation. On the foreign front, the role of the United States cannot be overemphasized. Domestically, ethnical division, religious divide, and the difficult economic situation in Sudan have all contributed to the conflict. However, this article argues that the foreign power play is not only largely responsible for the start and sustenance of the conflicts but remains a major stumbling block to the way of peace. It is not until those foreign forces cease fueling and nurturing conflicts that countries such as Sudan will regain their peace.
References
African Union. 2023. “African Union Condemns Violence in Sudan, Calls for Humanitarian Ceasefire and Urges Coordinated International Support to the Sudanese People Amidst Armed Confrontation.” African Union. https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20230502/african-union-condemns-violence-sudan-calls-humanitarian-ceasefire-and-urges.
Brown, Michael E., ed. 1996. The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. N.p.: MIT Press.
de Waal, Alex. 2023. “Alex de Waal · The Revolution No One Wanted: War in Khartoum · LRB 18 May 2023.” London Review of Books. https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v45/n10/alex-de-waal/the-revolution-no-one-wanted.
Downes, Alexander B. 2021. Catastrophic Success: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Goes Wrong. N.p.: Cornell University Press.
Doxsee, Catrina. 2023. “How Does the Conflict in Sudan Affect Russia and the Wagner Group?” CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-does-conflict-sudan-affect-russia-and-wagner-group.
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Lefebvre, Jeffrey A. 1991. “Globalism and Regionalism: U.S. Arms Transfers to Sudan.” Armed Forces & Society 17 (2): 211-227.
Malik, Mohamed, and Malik Malik. 2015. “The Efficacy of United States Sanctions on the Republic of Sudan.” Journal of Georgetown University-Qatar 2015, no. 1 (March): 1-11. http://dx.doi.org/10.5339/.
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Ramani, Samuel. 2020. “Russia's Port Sudan Naval Base: A Power Play on the Red Sea.” RUSI. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-port-sudan-naval-base-power-play-red-sea.
Tiezzi, Shannon. 2015. “UN Report: China Sold $20 Million in Arms and Ammunition to South Sudan.” The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/un-report-china-sold-20-million-in-arms-and-ammunition-to-south-sudan/.
UNHCR. 2023. “Media Advisory on Displacement figures on the Sudan situation.” UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.org/africa/news/press-releases/media-advisory-displacement-figures-sudan-situation.
Shultz, Richard. “The Role of External Forces in Third World Conflicts.” Comparative Strategy 4, no. 2 (1983): 79–111. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495938308402659.
Hill, J. Nigeria Since Independence: Forever Fragile? London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
Hassan, Mai, and Ahmed Kodouda. “Sudan’s Uprising: The Fall of a Dictator”. Journal of Democracy 30, no. 4 (October 2019): 89-103.
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